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RECONCILING DIFFERENCES DIFFERENTLY:
REFLECTIONS ON LABOR LAW AND WORKER
VOICE AFTER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Harry Arthurst
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul Weiler's vision of labor law has always been an optimistic
one. He hopes that through collective bargaining, differences
between workers and employers might be reconciled, that perhaps
something approximating distributive justice might be achieved in
American workplaces, and at worst, that workers might acquire a
collective "voice" with which to assert their interests and defend their
rights.' Indeed, the issue of worker "voice" is central to the Weiler
vision: without voice there can never be genuine reconciliation, only
paternalism or palliative measures. The question I address in this
article is whether, and if so how, worker "voice" is likely to survive the
decline of the statutory collective bargaining system that for seven
decades has given it legitimacy and form in North American
workplaces.
Collective bargaining is the project in which Weiler has invested
much of his formidable intellectual, political, and persuasive skills.
However, collective bargaining in the United States is a shadow of its
former self, embracing some 8% of the private sector workforce
rather than nearly 30% as it did in the 1960s when Weiler began his
scholarly career. In Canada, union density has stagnated at about
t Harry Arthurs, University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York
University. This is a companion piece to the contribution of Daphne Taras, which speaks more
specifically to new strategies for enhancing employee voice. We share great admiration for Paul
Weiler, served together as Commissioner (Arthurs) and Expert Advisor (Taras) of the Federal
Labour Standards Review Commission, and have cooperated in developing our respective
contributions to this symposium. This article expresses our personal views, not those of the
Commission, whose recent report FAIRNESS AT WORK: FEDERAL LABOUR STANDARDS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY, available at http://www.fls-ntf.gc.ca/en/index.asp, was released in October
2006.
1. PAUL C. WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW (1980).
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18% of the private sector workforce, well below its peak of over 30%
in the 1970s and 1980s.2
The fault is, of course, not Weiler's; nor is it exclusively or
primarily the fault of those who drafted, administered, and interpreted
the National Labor Relations Act or its Canadian progeny, which he
has worked so hard to reform, if not reinvent.3 Rather, the decline of
labor law is very much the result of the fundamental transformation
of the political economies of the industrialized West, and of
technological, sociological, and cultural changes that have undermined
working class solidarity, trade union movements, and labor's
economic power and electoral influence.4 These transformations, in
turn, have produced new constellations of government policies, new
strategies of employer resistance, new patterns of individual and
collective worker behavior.
Consequently, while those of us who shared in, admire, and still
stubbornly support Weiler's project must continue to think
optimistically about labor law, we must begin to think about labor law
after collective bargaining. We must explore new ways to provide
workers with some measure of industrial justice, for promoting
sensible and orderly resolution of workplace conflicts, and especially
for ensuring that states, markets, and employers are accurately
informed about and responsive to the needs and preferences of
workers. All of these require a voice mechanism of some description.
In this essay, I nominate labor standards legislation as a "dark horse"
candidate for selection as an alternative or additional vehicle for
worker voice; in her companion essay, Daphne Taras elaborates on
this notion, and identifies several other possibilities.'
2. COMM'N FOR LABOR COOPERATION, BRIEFING NOTES (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.nalc.org/English/pdf/apr_03-english.pdf
3. Weiler was one of the principal architects of the groundbreaking Labour Code of
British Columbia and the first chair of the innovative B.C. Labour Relations Board. His
experiences are recounted in WEILER, supra note 1. He was also a major contributor to the
work of the Dunlop Commission, the most ambitious (albeit unsuccessful) attempt to modernize
the U.S. National Labor Relations Act. See DUNLOP COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SEC'Y OF
LABOR AND SEC'Y OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGER
RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT (1994).
4. I have traced some of these changes in Harry Arthurs, What Immortal Hand or Eye?-
Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF
LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK (G. Davidov & B. Langille
eds., 2006).
5. Daphne Taras, Reconciling Differences Differently: Employee Voice in Public
Policymaking and Workplace Governance, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 167 (2007).
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II. LABOR STANDARDS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
LEGISLATION: AN AMBIGUOUS HISTORY
From the 1930s in the United States and the 1940s in Canada,
practitioners and theorists of collective bargaining have been
ambivalent in their view of legislated labor standards. On the one
hand, they generally concede that such standards are necessary. They
provide at least minimum protection for those who are most likely to
be denied voice: low skill, low wage workers; workers in service
industries and small enterprises; women workers and young people;
and workers with non-standard employment arrangements. Members
of these groups-so the reasoning runs-either lack marketable skills,
are located in marginal enterprises or sectors, or work in conditions in
which they are difficult to recruit into unions. On the other hand,
perhaps for those very reasons, participants in the collective
bargaining system came to regard legislated labor standards with some
condescension, as "labor law's little sister" (Judy Fudge's phrase) -a
member of the labor law family, to be sure, but something of an
embarrassment.6 The result, as Fudge notes, has been that women
workers (and by extension other vulnerable workers) have received
neither appropriate legal protection, nor appropriate levels of
attention from policy makers, scholarly analysts, and the union
movement. Looked at in a longer historical perspective, however,
legislated labor standards might equally be regarded as "labor law's
older - and morally superior - sibling."
As E.P. Thompson and others have shown, claims of entitlement
to "fair wages" based on custom or statute were commonplace among
elite tradesmen in 18th and early 19th century Britain.7 The ethical
norm of "fair wages" rapidly disappeared (or was disappeared, in the
Latin American sense of the term) during the early years of industrial
capitalism. However, the idea of ethical labor standards did not
vanish altogether, notwithstanding the growing dominance of free
markets and free market ideology. The U.K. Factories Acts of 1802-
1833-antecedents of contemporary labor standards legislation- also
rested on an ethical premise: that conditions of work must meet
fundamental standards of decency.8 Even at the height of "robber
baron" capitalism in late 19th century America, ethics animated many
6. JUDY FUDGE, LABOUR LAW'S LITTLE SISTER: THE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ACT
AND THE FEMINIZATION OF LABOUR (1991)
7. See, e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1977).
8. The legislation is reviewed in H.W. ARTHURS, "WITHOUT THE LAW"
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 103
(1985).
158 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 28:155
supporters of legislated labor standards: workers who campaigned for
the eight-hour day and day-of-rest legislation; "respectable people"
outraged by harrowing accounts of "sweated labor"; progressive
scholars and journalists deeply concerned about workers' moral as
well as material wellbeing; new political parties-Progressives,
Farmer-Labor, Liberals, Social Democrats-proposing legislation to
ensure that workers enjoyed their "fair share."9
As this brief historical sketch suggests, during the 19th century
worker voice-expressed in the context of industrial and political
mobilization-came to play an important role in the formation of
labor standards. In short, it was not only that workers sought and
accepted legislated standards that made those standards legitimate,
but also that they were widely perceived as the appropriate-the
ethical-response to the excesses of industrial capitalism. Indeed, as
late as the 1930s, collective bargaining and labor standards legislation
were perceived as complementary-not mutually exclusive-
strategies not only for ensuring decent conditions for workers but also
for restoring vitality to the economy. The New Deal, it must be
remembered, launched not only the National Labor Relations Act,
but the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act."°
Nonetheless, in North America's golden age of collective
bargaining-say from 1940 to 1970-legislated labor standards lost
their moral cachet. Once seen as a floor below which workers would
not be allowed to fall for reasons of public morality or civic decency,
they came to be regarded as a floor above which workers were
expected to rise through the exercise of their individual or collective
bargaining power. No longer did legislated labor standards epitomize
the just entitlements of the industrial proletariat; they represented the
subsistence rations left over for its camp-followers and reserve
battalions. This was a crucial shift in perception for which the labor
movement itself bears some responsibility. After all, unions had to
persuade workers that collective bargaining was a better way to
advance their interests than any alternatives-including legislation
and revolution. And unions had to be seen to be strong in their faith
that one day all workers would embrace collective bargaining, and
that in the "great by and by" there would be no need for legislated
standards.
9. DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE
(1998).
10. National Industrial Recovery Act, § 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); National Labor Relations
Act, § 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act), Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938).
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Nonetheless, to give the labor movement its due, collective
agreements were often the proving ground for innovative
arrangements such as paid vacations and overtime premiums, which
were later made universal and compulsory by labor standards
legislation. Indeed, in Quebec, legislation has long permitted the
government to issue decrees extending collectively bargained terms to
cover unorganized employers in a given sector such as construction or
the garment industry." Finally, unions generally supported and
sometimes led campaigns by social and anti-poverty movements to
secure improvements in minimum wage, maximum hours, health and
safety and other statutory regimes. This not only enhanced labor's
self-image as a progressive social movement; it also reinforced its
bargaining power by ratcheting up the minimum that employers were
legally entitled to offer in collective negotiations.
That said, it is difficult to explain why labor law and industrial
relations scholars largely chose to ignore labor standards. Perhaps, as
Fudge implies, labor standards were ignored as a field of inquiry
because those who mainly benefited from them did not conform to the
ideal-type of white, male semi-skilled and skilled industrial workers
who populated the domain of collective bargaining.
Or perhaps scholars were carried away by their own hyperbolic
characterization of collective bargaining as the instantiation of quasi-
constitutional values. Collective bargaining legislation, they claimed,
had ended the employer's absolute rule in the workplace, introduced
democratic elections that permitted workers to select their bargaining
representatives, mandated those representatives to participate in a
quasi-legislative negotiating process that would establish their terms
and conditions of employment, and guaranteed "citizens at work" the
same rights of due process and free speech that they enjoyed in the
rest of their lives. By contrast, labor standards-a minimum wage of x
dollars per hour, maximum work weeks of y hours per week, paid
vacations of z days per year-seemed to express more prosaic, less
transcendent values.
Or perhaps scholars genuinely believed that collective bargaining
was more likely to advance workers' interests than legislated
standards because collective bargaining was more consonant with the
assumptions of a free market economy. Collective bargaining after
all, was still bargaining; countervailing power was still power; and as
11. J-G Bergeron & D. Veilleux, The Quebec Collective Agreement Decrees Act: A Unique
Model of Collective Bargaining, 22 QUEEN'S L.J. 135 (1996). However, as the authors note, the
application of the decree system has been considerably curtailed in recent years.
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things turned out, business unionism was still business. Moreover, as
Weiler and others have noted, collective bargaining plays an
important function not only in the wider labor market but also in the
internal labor market of individual firms. If they have no other way to
do so, workers can signal their dissatisfaction with wages or working
conditions only by "exiting" or quitting, thus depriving the firm of
their knowledge and skill, and of its sunk investment in their
recruitment and training. However, if they have access to a "voice"
mechanism, workers can bring their concerns to management's
attention so that it can respond in a timely and positive fashion and
avoid the loss of valued workers. Collective bargaining has
traditionally provided workers with that "voice."'" Thus, whether
approached from an external or internal labor market perspective,
collective bargaining uses the rhetoric and respects the logic of free
enterprise. By contrast, labor standards legislation uses more
normative rhetoric, and expresses the logic of the activist state-
rhetoric and logic whose persuasive power remains extremely limited,
especially in the United States.
Or perhaps its proponents were actually convinced that collective
bargaining offered workers greater agency, greater empowerment, in
the workplace, than they were likely to achieve in the wider political
process within which labor standards would have to be debated and,
ultimately, enacted. This belief, for many industrial relations scholars,
was grounded not so much in beguiling constitutional rhetoric as in an
observable sociological phenomenon. Every complex social field,
whatever its formal structures of governance, is to some extent ruled
by informal, implicit, and often invisible norms and decision-making
processes.13 The workplace-whose operations depend on the close
cooperation of hundreds or thousands of actors, in fast-changing
circumstances, over long periods of time, and despite often conflicting
interests-is inevitably replete with such informal, implicit, invisible
norms and processes. What collective bargaining does is to make
many of these formal, explicit, and visible, to confer legitimacy on
them, and to mediate between them and the established structures of
corporate governance. In doing so, it makes clear that workers have a
substantial role to play in creating and enforcing the normative regime
of the workplace. By contrast, under labor standards legislation,
12. R. Freeman & J. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INT. 69 (1979).
13. The literature is reviewed in H.W. Arthurs, Landscape and Memory: Labour Law,
Legal Pluralism and Globalization, in ADVANCING THEORY IN LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 21 (T. Wilthagen ed., 1996).
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workers are usually perceived as the mere passive beneficiaries of
actions taken by legislators on their behalf.
III. WORKER RIGHTS, POWER, VOICE, AND AGENCY: THE FUTURE
OF LABOR STANDARDS
Whatever the reason, labor law and industrial relations scholars
were never able to muster the same enthusiasm for labor standards as
for collective bargaining, nor did they develop equally elaborate
justificatory theories for labor standards or advocate equally plausible
political and legal strategies. Now the situation has changed.
Whatever collective bargaining was meant to accomplish-the
projection of democratic rights into the workplace, the rebalancing of
external labor markets through the introduction of countervailing
power, the use of "voice" to make internal labor markets more
efficient, the legitimization of workers' participation in management
decision-making-these things can no longer be accomplished by
collective bargaining alone, or perhaps at all. Scholars will have to
explore alternative strategies.
The moment is not propitious. The decline of collective
bargaining has contributed to growing economic inequality. It has
also coincided with, and likely helped to cause, a decline in the quality
of workers' lives, as pensions, medical insurance, paid vacations,
sociable hours of work, job security, and other collectively-bargained
benefits become available to fewer and fewer North American
workers. And finally, the decline of collective bargaining-both a
cause and a consequence of the decline of working class solidarity-
has left a black hole in the political firmament. Unions once had some
success in mobilizing workers' support for pro-labor parties and
legislation, and exercised considerable political leverage through their
participation in progressive coalitions. With the decline of collective
bargaining, and of the union movement, those coalitions have now
largely ceased to exist. So too, to a significant extent, has organized
labor's capacity to influence public policy.
Hence two questions: First, might legislated labor standards
serve as the functional equivalent of collective bargaining? Second, if
so, what are the prospects that in the present climate, the moral
appeal of decent labor standards might again-as it once did-help to
rally workers' strength and solidarity, and to enlist public concern
about workers' needs and interests?
The answer to the first question is clearly "yes." Workers denied
decent wages and working conditions or recourse against arbitrary
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and discriminatory treatment might be guaranteed all of these by
labor standards legislation. Indeed, they already enjoy such
guarantees to some extent, especially in Canada; new legislation could
in principle fill gaps and up antes. For example, in several Canadian
jurisdictions, workers are protected by labor standards legislation
against unjust dismissal, workplace bullying, and pay policies that
disfavor women, while a number of U.S. states and cities have recently
adopted "fair wage" or "living wage" laws.
Of course employers and others object to legislated labor
standards because they supposedly increase labor costs and lead to
dis-employment-arguments also used against collective bargaining.
However, just as collective bargaining produces positive outcomes in
external and internal labor markets to offset anticipated higher costs,
so too does labor standards legislation. For example, "fair," "living,"
or minimum wages enhance the purchasing power of low wage
workers, triggering multiplier effects across the local economy.
Legislated standards can facilitate the operating of labor markets by
forcing inefficient enterprises, which now compete on the basis of
exploitative working conditions, to compete instead on the basis of
improved technology or better sales strategies. Workers displaced
from their jobs in these enterprises might help to alleviate the labor
shortages that loom over some sectors of the economy. Legislated
standards that require employers to provide training, or to give
workers time off to participate in the training programs of state or
private providers, can enhance the productive capacities of many
businesses. Improved attention to training can also make the
workforce more mobile and adaptable, with long-term outcomes that
are positive not only for workers but for employers and for the
economy as a whole. Legislated standards requiring that employers
respect the need of workers to attend to home and community
responsibilities may lead to lower levels of absenteeism, less stress and
stress-induced illness, and consequently higher productivity. And
laws that effectively reduce stress in the workplace, forbid excessive
working hours, and provide periods of rest and relaxation may in the
end reduce the health care costs of the employer whether paid as
premiums for private health insurance or as taxes to support a public
health care system.
Finally, like collective bargaining, legislated standards need not
operate on a "one size fits all" basis-as witness the many variations
and exceptions typically permitted under existing labor standards
statutes. Given that so many employers seek temporary or permanent
relief from labor standards, it may be possible to induce or require
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them to consult their workers on scheduling, overtime, vacations, and
similar matters. Not only would this re-introduce a voice mechanism
into workplaces from which unions have disappeared; it would likely
decrease quits, absenteeism, poor work performance, and other
manifestations of "exit" behavior. Moreover, a system of legislated
standards that explicitly encouraged "regulated flexibility" at the level
of individual enterprises or at a sectoral level might, like collective
bargaining, respond to the special requirements of particular kinds of
business operations.
Legislated standards, in short, could help to initiate a virtuous
circle in which workers enjoy improved conditions at work and
enhanced control over their daily routines, employers experience
improved productivity, and the community and economy benefit as
well-all goals shared by collective bargaining. And, if recent
evidence is to be believed, they could accomplish all this without
encumbering the economy with labor costs that cannot be recaptured
through improved economic performance. However, while legislated
standards could do some of the work of collective bargaining, they
depend crucially on the willingness of elected politicians to enact
them. This brings us to the second question posed above: Is it
conceivable that labor standards might prove to be a political rallying
point not only for low wage workers but also for their more privileged
colleagues and their sympathizers in the broader society?
On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that legislative
solutions in general have not attracted much support in recent years
when market forces have come to be widely accepted as the public
policy instrument of choice. And labor standards specifically have
engendered little overt enthusiasm: neo-classical economists
disparage them as a constraint on labor market flexibility; progressive
scholars and analysts who ought to be their most enthusiastic
advocates treat them with disdain; and even workers (their principal
beneficiaries) often seem indifferent to their potential advantages.
Some standards are repealed by hostile legislators; others, such as the
minimum wage, are left un-amended for years and consequently
provide diminished protection; still others go unenforced by
administrators who lack resources or zeal, or are rendered innocuous
by ignorant or unsympathetic judicial interpretations. 4
14. For a particularly egregious example, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991) and Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) upholding the right of employers
to require workers to arbitrate their claims under protective labor legislation rather than pursue
their statutory remedies. Recent decisions make clear that Gilmer and Circuit City apply to
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It might seem, then, that there is no more chance of legislating
high labor standards than there is of reforming labor relations
legislation in order to breathe new life into collective bargaining.
However, in the optimistic spirit of Paul Weiler, another scenario can
be imagined.
A new body of research suggests a positive correlation between
high labor standards, labor market flexibility, productivity, and
economic growth.15 If that research survives analysis and critique,
employers and governments may well come to appreciate that
legislated labor standards are not the enemy of a dynamic economy.
New "flexicurity" strategies in the European Union are already
proving that legislated labor standards, in combination with other
policy instruments, can improve the performance of labor markets.
16
New experiments with "high performance workplace systems" are
already demonstrating to employers the productivity-enhancing
potential of humane HR policies and of empowering workers and
listening to their voice. 7 New evidence and argument may even come
to persuade labor leaders and academics that legislated standards can
operate alongside, in support of, or, at worst, in lieu of collective
bargaining.
Ironically, many leading enterprises seem to share that belief in
practice if not in principle. For example, a 2005 survey of Canadian
federal jurisdiction employers shows that many of the largest firms
pay considerably more than minimum wage, offer longer vacations
and more holidays than required by legislation, and are experimenting
with new employee-friendly working-time strategies, many of which
respond to worker preferences as expressed through surveys and focus
groups.18  In many of these firms, to be sure, worker "voice" is
expressed neither through unions nor through non-union employee
associations; it is therefore less authentic or influential than it might
be. On the other hand, given that many employers accept the need to
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage, 346 F.3d
821 (8th Circ. 2003); Carter v. Countryside Credit, 362 F 3d 294 (5th Circ. 2004).
15. See, e.g., J. Stiglitz, Employment, Social Justice and Social Well-being, 141 INT'L. LAB.
REV. 9 (2002); R. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (R.
Flanagan & W. Gould eds., 2003).
16. See, e.g., T. Wilthagen & F. Tros, The Concept of "Flexicurity": A new approach to
regulating employment and labour markets, at http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/frw/
research/schoordijk/flexicurity/publications/papers/fxp2003-4.pdf; P.K. Madsen, The Danish
Road to Flexicurity: Where are We And How Did We Get There?, in EMPLOYMENT POLICY
FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES (T. Bredgaard & F. Larsen eds., 2005).
17. See, e.g., E. APPELBAUM ET AL., WHY HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK SYSTEMS PAY OFF
(2000).
18. STATISTICS CANADA, FEDERAL JURISDICTION WORKPLACE SURVEY (2005).
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consult and respond to workers' needs and preferences, it is hard to
see why they would object to innovative labor standards legislation
designed to improve the clarity and accuracy of worker "voice."
However, it must be said that by no means all enterprises accept
the need for relatively generous treatment of their workers, or make
significant, if imperfect, efforts to consult them. Indeed, the same
2005 survey indicated that many smaller firms and firms in sectors
such as trucking were in breach of one or more statutory labor
standards, and that these firms also provided fewer benefits to their
workers and, often, lower salaries. Other evidence suggests that lower
standards are also relatively common in the manufacturing, service,
and hospitality sectors, all of which come under provincial jurisdiction.
And finally, whether attributable to the employment practices of any
given set of employers or to broader developments across the
economy, the negative effects of low labor standards are being
experienced by significant numbers of some ordinary worker-citizens:
static or declining real incomes; shorter, less secure, and more
ambiguous job tenure; greater exposure to financial crises for those
who lack disability or dental insurance or an adequate pension; less
and less time after work for family, leisure, and civic activities.
If these observations are accurate, if more and more people are
indeed coming to feel that their working conditions are unsatisfactory,
unhealthy, or unfair, labor standards may again become the focus of
wide-ranging public policy debate. Such a debate, indeed, has already
begun. In the United States it has focused on the plight of vulnerable
workers who face exploitation in the workplace and are not being paid
a "fair" or "living" wage. In Canada it has been developing for some
time as governments at all levels have gradually begun to update their
labor standards legislation, presumably in response to public concerns
and, it must be assumed, with some degree of employer acquiescence
if not support.
Thus, there are two reasons to believe that labor standards may
finally be able to claim a place on the public policy agenda. The first
is that positive evidence is accumulating that attention to decent labor
standards may help to improve economic performance; the second is
that discontent with falling and occasionally exploitative standards
may be emerging as a concern for a broad spectrum of workers and
voters. Legislation that emerges from this renewed interest in labor
standards will be very different from the legislation enacted sixty or
seventy years ago to protect and project worker "voice" through
collective bargaining. Nonetheless, labor standards legislation can
hardly avoid the issue of "voice." If the object is to alleviate abusive
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working conditions, workers must somehow be given a say in
establishing their hours of work and other workplace routines. If the
aim is to promote best practices, workers must be closely involved not
only in establishing their own workplace routines but in a host of
other issues relating to the employer's operations.
My own intuition is that attempts to introduce worker "voice" in
North American workplaces by transplanting European works
councils across the Atlantic are unlikely to succeed. In part this is
because works councils are somewhat in disarray in Europe itself, in
part because management structures and workplace practices differ
considerably as between Europe and North America. But I believe
that a period of experimentation with varied approaches to "voice"
mechanisms with specific functions, tailored to specific contexts, is
likely to demonstrate that such mechanisms are not only legitimate
but valuable. Whether such mechanisms are also viable in the long
term in the absence of strong unions and collective bargaining systems
is a more difficult question. Whether success with these modest
experiments might whet the appetite for more ambitious "voice"
mechanisms, even for unions, is a more intriguing one.
